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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE COURT ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS IN AFARDING 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON A PURPORTED CONTRACT THAT WAS 
STRUCK Am A DIFFERENT TIME, INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTIES 
AND FOR A DIFFERENT AMOUNT, THAN WAS PLEAD. 
On pa<*e eight and nine of the Memorandum Decision 
is the following: 
I believe that the evidence clearly preponderates in show-
in? that Plaintiff performed substantial accountinp; service 
at Brooks1 renuest over a number of years for x^ hich it 
was not compensated and a gross injustice would result 
under the facts and circumstances of this case to allow 
Brooks to escape complete liability therefor on the sole 
basis that such services should have been paid by the 
various business entities operated by him. However, I 
note that after the parties had agreed to settle the 
account for $6,000.00 with monthlv payments thereon of 
$200.00 to be paid, and two such payments were made in 
April and May, 1983, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on 
June 6, 1983, without prior notice that the agreed to 
settlement was no longer in effect. Both parties x^ ere 
at fault in the method by which the account was handled. 
I thus find that issues on Plaintiff's complaint in 
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and 
award judgment in the amount of $5,600.00 with interest 
thereon and costs. No attorneys fees are awarded. 
Defendant submits that the Court acted totally outside 
of the pleadings in the case, and has awarded judgment to the 
plaintiff on a purported agreement and contract which was not 
breached nor was the same in default. 
This is especiallv reflected in the Court's own words 
on pages 15 and 16 of the fourth day of trial: 
. . . Mr. Brooks testimony was to the effect that 
he was repeatedly was asking for a breakdown of the 
charges with respect to the various companies for 
which that particular charge related. vou mentioned 
the agreement he had with the secretary. It certainly 
supports his position that the individual charges 
^or work done were to be paid by the entity for 
which the work was done, you see, and I view Mr. 
Brooks' position, yes, Mr. Tebbs was employed by 
him to do work but it included work for each of 
these entities, as well as himself. And his testi-
mony was consistent throughout, I think, that he 
expected each individual entity to pay its proportion-
ate part of Mr. Tebbs! services performed for that 
particular entity and that it was to be charged to 
that entitv and had it been charged, would have been 
paid by that entity, you see. And that has been his 
comnlaint throughout "the trial, as I see it, was 
that he was never able to pet Mr. Tebbs to give him 
a breakdown on the entity for which these particular 
charges that he was billing him for could be attributed. 
"Defendant submits that it is critical to note that this 
is a comment made bv the Court a^ter both sides had rested. There 
was no additional evidence submitted to the Court a^ter this point 
in the trial, and so there would be no new or additional evidence 
submitted to the Court which could give rise to a different 
position. 
Notwithstanding, the Court at pa^e eie;ht of the Memoran-
dum Decision states that since ^lainti^ had done a lot of work 
and since it would be a p-ross injustice to allow Mr. Brooks to 
escape comnlete liability, plaintiff should o-et something. 
The problem is that the Court awarded iudoment to 
plaintiff in a sxtm certain and on the basis o^ a purported agree-
ment which was never breached and not in default. Note the 
ten-day summons was served on the Defendant some nine (9) days 
approximately after the May Payment was made, ie: May 13, 1983. 
Plaintiff suggests in its brief, that the Court ax^ arded 
judgment on what was set forth in the pleadings with only the 
amount that was different. 
Defendant submits that this is without merit. 
Defendant and ^lainti^ had agreed on the sum of $6,000.00 
total at $200.00 a month. Defendant had fulfilled both the letter 
and snirit of the agreement, when Defendant is hit UD with a 
lawsuit demanding $12,324.47 ^or services that were allegedly 
contracted for lonp- before the above stated agreement. 
A^ter the Court heard the testimonv of the alleged 
original agreement, it awarded judpnient not at all on that basis, 
but on the basis that a ?ross injustice would occur if Mr. Brooks 
did not t>ay something. 
It iust so turns out, that Mr. Brooks was already t>aying 
that something, at tx*zo hundred dollars a month, as agreed. 
Now the whole amount is reduced to judgment and with 
interest and costs. 
Bottomline, Mr. Brooks is ordered to nay a sum certain 
not because he agreed to do so, as alleged by ¥r. poole in the 
comnlaint; not because he had renuested and nersonally received 
accounting services to the tune df £12,324.^7; not because demand 
xtfas made ut>on the Defendant and "he bailed and recused to nay the 
same." 
No, iud**ment was awarded to ^lainti^^ because it would be 
unjust not to p-ive ^ laintif* something. 
As noted throughout the trial, Defendant objected to 
all of the testimony regarding amounts owed, because there was 
not a single shred o^ evidence, not even a mention, as to the 
reasonable value of the services rendered. 
Mr. ^oole took the position that the amount due was 
billed and the bills were venerated in the regular course and 
scope o^ the business, and then never so much as attempted to 
establish the reasonable value of the services. Note Ex. 2-"° 
In fact, he could not because the time spent was never 
made a part of the record, and so he could not have established 
the reasonable value of the services allegedly performed. 
This involved an alleged agreement to perform services 
and then bill for the same. It is not like an agreement where 
there is an agreed amount due once all of the work is completed. 
Po there could not have been a final amount agreed upon by 
Mr. "Brooks ^rom the beginning. 
^ence, with no evidence as to the reasonable value of 
the alleged services, there can be no award in any amount either 
on a breach of contract theory as alleged in the complaint nor 
on an uniust enrichment theorv as set ^orth by the Court, because 
the Court could only speculate as to the value of the alleged 
enrichment. 
This is so because there was no evidence as to the time 
expended for the work alleged to have been completed, and there 
was no evidence as to the fair market value of the said time. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court did not 
award iud^ment to the plaintiff on the basis o* the pleadings. 
In fact, the express statement in the pleadings that demand had 
been made, and the Defendant had failed and refused to pay the 
same was the exact opposite o^ what the evidence was and what 
the Court found. 
furthermore, the Defendant states throughout his testi-
mony that the onlv reason he was payin<* the £6,000.00 was because 
of a concern about Mr. ^ebbs personally, so that Mr. Tebbs would 
not have this charged back to him within the plaintiffTs corpora-
tion. 
Fence, the subseouent agreement was not even with the 
"Plaintiff, but was between vhc. Tebbs personally and the Defendant. 
defendant submits that there can be no Question, that 
the Court stepped well outside of the pleadings in awarding 
iud^ment to the ^lainti^f for monies involved in the Personal 
agreement with Mr. ^ebbs. 
Hence, Defendant respectfully submits that the Court 
acted outside of the pleadings in awarding iudment to plaintiff 
on a purported contract that was struck at a di^erent time, 
involving di^^erent parties and for a different amount. 
ARGUMENT ^ 0 
THE SUPPORTED SUBSEOUFN^ A^RFFMENT FOR THE ^A^fFNT 
OF $6,000.00 AT $200.00 *ER MONTH WAS NOT BLEACHED 
BY THE DEFENDANT; THE COURT MADE NO SUCH FINDING 
^HAT IT HAD BFEN BRFACHED, AND THFRE WAS NO COMPETENT 
FVIDENCF THAT IT HAD BEFN BRFACHED. 
Plaintiff suggests that Brooks was delinauent on the 
two payments that were made on the $6,000.00 agreement. He 
flat out states that Judge Croft so found, and that there was 
sufficient evidence ^or such a finding. plaintiff further 
su^pests that Judge Cro^t had clearly held that both payments 
were delinauent so there was a breach o^ this subsecuent con-
tract. 
Defendant submits that Jud^e Croft made no such find-
in*?, and that was surely not part of his ruling. Note page 
nine of the Memorandum Decision: 
However, I note that after the parties had agreed to 
settle the account for $6,000.00 with monthly payments 
thereon o^ ^200.00 to be t>aid, and two such payments 
were made in Anril and May, 1°83, plaintiff filed this 
lawsuit on June 6, 1983, without orior notice that 
the agreed to settlement was no longer in effect. 
Defendant further submits that not only is it incorrect 
to suggest that Judee Cro^t so held, but that there was absolutely 
no competent evidence to that e^ect. 
That is to say, that there was no competent evidence that 
the payments were to be received by the first of each month, only 
that thev were to be received durinp- each month, furthermore the 
agreement was to the e^ect that there was to be no interest. 
Mr. poole suggests that the navments were made but 
late in his onenin°- argument on na^e 3 o^ dav one. On page 9^  
and following, of day one, Mr. Tebbs testified that he had no 
conversation with Mr. Brooks regarding any agreement that the 
payment was to be received on or about the ^irst o^ each month. 
Mr. Tebbs testified that the agreement, if any, was struck 
between Mrs. Montgomery and Mr. Brooks. 
Then on na?e 130 of the ^irst day of trial, Mrs. Mont-
gomery testified that the payments were to be made each month, 
with no reference as to when they were to be paid during the mon 
Mr. Brooks testified on oa^e 24 on the second day of 
trial that he was to make a payment each month and again on 
pa^e 48 o^ the same day, with no reference as to when, except 
merely during the month. 
However, on page 55 of the second day of trial, he 
states that as reelected in Exhibits Jh^L-Ti and ^A35-D, he made 
his two nayments on time, one for April and one ^or May, and 
then is sued with the ten-day summons on May 27, 1983. Also 
note page 48 of the second day of trial. 
On page 53 of the second day o^ trial, Brooks testified 
that there had been no contact regarding not having complied 
with the agreement, before he was hit UP with the lawsuit. 
Defendant submits that it is significant to note that 
the agreement was to the e-^ect that there was to be no interest 
charged on the £6,000.00. However Judge Croft awarded interest 
at the highest legal rate allowable. 
On nages 80 and 81 0? the second day of trial, Mr. 
Brooks testified that he had an agreement with Mr. Tebbs that 
he would not be charged any interest, and this was agreed to 
not just once, but had been the subiect of their conversation 
"at lease two or three" times. 
Hence, the only comnetent evidence on when the payments 
were to be made, was to the effect that they could be paid at 
any time during the month, and this comes by way of the testimony 
of Mrs, Montgomery and Mr. Brooks. Mso, the only competent 
evidence regarding the issue of interest is by way of Mr. Brooks 
and that is to the effect that there was to be none. 
Defendant therefore, resDect^ully submits that there was 
no breach o^ this agreement, he was totally current at the time 
that he was sued and furthermore, based unon the evidence there 
was to be no interest on the same. 
Defendant submits that the reason that the Court did 
not nick this up, as well as missinp- some very critical evidence 
throughout, especially on the counterclaim, is because the Court 
could not hear. 
Through the course of the entire trial, the Honorable 
Bryant Croft was not well, he had a cold and had had it for some 
time. Each day that evidence was submitted, the Court suggested 
that it had a nroblem hearing the evidence. 
On na^e 78 o^ the first day of trial Judge Croft states: 
TFF COURT1: My problem, gentlemen, I have been sick 
since last Thursday or Friday and not feeling very-
good at the present time. Whether or not I could go 
through the rest of the afternoon, remains to be 
seen. I will do the best I can. It may be, if we 
don't finish about midafternoon, we may have to 
recess until tomorrow. 
Then on page 62 of the second day of trial, the Court 
flat out states that it can not hear because of his cold. 
"Plaintiff submits that not only was there substantial 
evidence on certain points as stated in this and the Appellant's 
Briefs, but the Court really was not well, and could not hear 
as reflected throughout the entire trial. 
On the first day of trial at oaee 108, the Judge 
misses the point altogether. At page 11Q the Court states that 
it is going to have to quit for the day because of his health. 
On the same page is another example of the Court not being able 
to hear. On page 121 the Court receives Ex. 28, without even 
inauiring if there was an objection. On page 123 is another 
example of the Court not hearing the evidence. Finally on 
page 133, the Court concluded the trial for the day because of 
the problems. 
As an example of the problems on the second day, note 
page 128 where the Court asked that the evidence be repeated. 
On the third day of trial, at oage 23, the Court had 
a problem hearing the evidence. On page 38 of the same day the 
Court again states that it has a nroblem and can not hear. Once 
more at nap-e 36 the Court states that it has a problem, and 
finally on page 42 the Droblem is ap-ain reflected. 
All in all, the first three (3) davs were the days 
that evidence was submitted. The fourth day of trial was only 
"for closing; arsument, so there was no evidence submitted on 
that day. 
Defendant submits that Judp-e Croft pushed himself 
too far when he was not well, and as a result some critical 
evidence which is addressed in the Memorandum Decision is flat 
out not the case. 
For example, the Court states that each party was 
equally at fault in how the accountant handled his own account. 
Defendant submits that such a claim has no basis in the evidence. 
For this reason, Defendant reauests that the matter be 
heard a^ain completely, so that he can have an adjudication of 
the matter on all of the evidence. 
For this reason coupled with the ^act that the Defendant 
did not breach any subsecruent agreement, the matter should be 
remanded to the District Court with instructions to the effect 
that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits, and iudgment be entered ^or the Defendant on the Counter-
claim in the sum of $61,500.00, should this Court rule that a 
rehearing of the matter on the merits be unnecessary. 
AROTJMENT HTHRFF 
THF*E IS NO MERIT TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL SUGGESTION 
THAT MR. ^EBPS AGREED TO BILL BROOKS INDIVIDUALLY; 
THAT NO RFOUEST FOR ITEMIZATION WAS MADE Bv BROOKS 
IN WRITING, AND THAT BROOKS DID NOT RESPOND TO THE 
BILLINGS IN TJRTTING. 
Plaintiff's counsel suggests in his brief that Mr. 
Tebbs aereed to bill Brooks individually; that no reouest for 
itemization was made by Brooks in writing, and that Brooks 
did not respond to the billings in writinp. 
Defendant submits that this whole line of reasoning 
is without merit. 
Mr. Tebbs stated on nao-e 57 of the ^irst day o^ trial, 
that he was aware of at least one renuest for an itemization and 
that there could have been more. 
He reiterates the same on page 71 and SI and 82 of the 
first day of trial and admits that Exhibit 22-D reflected the 
same as a document coming from the "Plaintiff's files. 
Mr. ^ebbs also, admitted that Exhibit 25-D, was a docu-
ment coming from the Plaintiff's own records reflecting the 
reauest for separate bills. Note page 94 of day one. 
Mr. Brooks testified on na(ge 31 o^ the second day of 
trial, that his accounting system was created by Mr. Tebbs, 
which itself called for a pavment to the accountants, and then 
continuing on page 32, Mr. Brooks testified that he had reciuested 
the bill for that singular purpose on several occasions. 
Mr. Brooks testified on Page 32 on the second day of trial, 
that he did not commingle any funds from the separate entities and 
that the profit and loss statements prepared bv Plaintiff called 
for payments to ^laintif^. Vet still there was no itemization. 
On paee 37 of the second day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that he told "Plaintiff that he would not pay them any 
monies until he received an itemization on each bill for each 
entity. 
Mr. Tebbs was doine the taxes ^or Mr. Brooks and the 
other companies and so he was surely ax^ are how the businesses 
were operated. Note nap;e 39 o^ the second day of trial. 
On pape 41 and pape 105 of the second day of trial, 
Mr. Brooks and a secretarv of the different companies, Candy 
Tabor testified that each entitv had a separate checking account, 
and that Mr. Brooks never paid a business debt with funds from 
a different business nor did he nay business debts with his 
personal account or visa versa. 
This, of course, "Plaintiff well knew because of the 
tax preparation ^or each entity, and the sale of each entity, 
and the way that they were sold. Note pap;e 64 of the second 
dav of trial. 
On pa<?e 66 of the second day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that he had submitted written reauests -For statements 
in the sale of the Ice Cream Ftore, ^ anderiq;ht, Inc. (pizza 
Loft and "Pizza Wapon) and the New vQrk pasta Co. to "°laintiff. 
On the second dav of trial, Candy Tabor testified 
that as an employee of the comnanies she was paid separatelv 
by each entitv. 
Candy stated on pape 97 of the second day of trial, 
that she was present when Mr. Brooks asked for an itemization 
-From Mr. Tebbs, once in Aueust, 1978, once in October, 1^78, and 
a third time in early 1979. These, as well as other times, 
note paq;e 110 of the second day of trial. 
Even the Court inquired as to how many times and what 
Mr. Tebbs would respond after he had committed to produce the 
itemizations and then had ^ailed to do so. 
On the second day of trial at nape 113, is the 
following: 
THE COURT: when you talked to Mr. Tebbs and made 
your recuest pursuant to direction from Mr. Brooks 
to p-ive you a breakdown on the billinps, what did 
he say? 
THE WITNESS: He said, "I will pet you one." 
^ E COURT: And did he do so? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think so. 
THF COURT": You never recall receiving one then? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Did you ever, in discussing with him a^ain, 
you said, "Well, you said you would send me one and you 
didn't" or words to that effect? 
^HE ™TTNFSS: Rieht, and he said, "I will do it." 
On page one of the fourth day of trial, the Honorable 
Bryant Croft, made this comment before hearing closing argument: 
. . . but it seems to me with resnect to the Plaintiff's 
claim, a critical factor is what proof has been made as 
to work specifically done for Mr. Brooks, as an individual 
independent of what mi^ht have been done for any of his 
entities? 
Lastly, on paces 15, 16 and 17 of the fourth day of 
trial Judce Cro^t swelled out all of the problems with the 
evidence o* the Plaintiff's case. 
In doing so, the Court pointed out what Defendant 
believes to be the most obvious problem with the plaintiff?s 
case, and that it that we have an accountant suing a defendant 
for how the accountant himself handled his own account with 
the defendant. 
Defendant herein stronely ur^es this Court to review 
the Court1s comments on paces 15, 16 and 17, of day ^our of 
the trial in coniunction with the actual ruling of the Court, 
because Defendant submits that this is dispositive o^ the notion 
that the Court awarded iudo^ nent on an uniust enrichment theory 
as is discussed in Argument One, above. 
ARHUMFNT FOTTO 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED DEFENDANT 
$61,500.00 ON THE RASIS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM. 
Defendant suggests that the singular most "ftross 
iniustice11 x*as what the lower Court did with the Counterclaim. 
^lainti^ in his brie^ suggests that the information 
which was generated ^or the bonding coirroany was inadeauate, so 
the timeliness of the delivery of the same becomes immaterial. 
He p-oes on and suepcests that even i* it were material, Mr. 
Brooks did nothing to pet a cash bond during the two hours he 
had before the bid openinp. 
Defendant submits that this is all very misleading. 
Defendant reiterates his position so that there can 
be no ouestion as to the promixate cause of his damages. 
Defendant contends that if the accounting, however 
inadeauate, x^ ould have been delivered where it should have been 
and when it should have been, he would have been able to secure 
a different type of bond and would have been awarded the iob 
which would have rendered him the £61,500.00 prayed for in the 
Motion to Amend the pleadinps, to conform to the evidence, made 
by the Defendant's counsel at the end of the evidence. Note 
page 38 of the third day of trial. 
Mr. Hrooks had been involved with other l.v.'D. pro-
iects before and after this bid, and had dealth personally with 
the project manager for the bid in question, Mr. Richard Drows 
rep-ardino- the same. Note page 3 o^ the second day of trial. 
Mr. Brooks was specifically invited to bid the subject 
project, which was not open to public biddine, but only to a 
sellect few who had what Mr. prows called a pre-screening. Note 
pages 5 and 9 of the second day of trial and Ex. 29-D 
Mr. Prows testified that he did not know of any reason 
why Mr. Brooks would be disaualified or otherwise unacceDtable 
to bid this iob. Note page 8 of the second day of trial. This 
is very important because Mr. Prows along with his company was 
the District Manager for this Droject, and that without exception, 
when ^rowswood approved of a bidder, the same x^ as awarded accord-
ingly. Note page 11 of the second day of trial. 
It is important to note that there were five individual 
bids for this overall I.p.p. project. Mr. Brooks had submitted 
for three of the five bids. He attempted to bid a fourth which 
would have been a rnrofit to him in the sum of $61,500.00; this 
is the subject of the Count erclaim. The onlv nart that Mr. Brooks 
did not attempt to bid was one where Mr. Brooks1 supplier was 
directly bidding the project, and so Mr. Brooks did not attempt to 
bid that part. 
Therefore, on page 13 of the second day of trial it is 
especially critical to note that the District Manager, ^rowswood, 
had approved the Defendant's bids on each of the other three 
that he bid, and he was awarded everyone of the same. 
Mr. Brooks had assisted drafting the plans and specifica-
tions for the project. Note pa^e 3 and 5 of the third day of 
trial, also Exhibit #45-D. In addition note Exhibit 29-D and 
page 10, regarding the invitation directed specifically to Defend-
ant to bid this job. 
Defendant testified that he had done four I."P."P. 
projects, one before the one that is the subiect of the 
Counterclaim and three after. Note page 2 of the third day 
of trial. 
Defendant testified that the one that he did before 
the one that is the subject of the Counterclaim was for the 
sum of $550,000.00. Note page 3 o^ the third day of trial. 
So it would not be fair to say that the bid reflected in the 
Counterclaim for approximately $6 75,000.00 was beyond his 
experience, and that he had been doing small stuff before and 
now was taking on some biR stuff, nor that he was now taking 
something on with which he was unfamiliar. Note Exhibit 30-D 
The bid which is the subiect of the Counterclaim was 
for the delivery and installation of fixtures and furnishings, 
and so it was merely a matter of finding the best price and 
then delivering the item, so all of the costs, etc., were finite, 
exact and complete at the outset. 
"Plaintiff suggests throughout his brief that the profit 
to the Defendant, as asserted in the Counterclaim was not 
established at the time of trial, and that the Court could only 
speculate as to the same. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
At paee 27 of the third day of trial the Defendant 
spelled out exactly what his profit was, and how he derived the 
same. 
In fact, Defendant's counsel attempted to establish 
without question the exact profit beyond that as reflected on 
page 27 of the third day of trial, and the Court on page 28 
and 29 of the same day, would not allow this same. Note 
also pa^e 65 o? the ^ourth day of trial as well as Ex. 46-D. 
There can be no auestion that 1* Mr. Brooks had had 
his bond so that he could bid the proiect, Mr. Brooks would 
have been awarded the same, as he was low bidder, at $676,000.00 
Note pages 10 and 11 o^ the second day of trial. 
The onlv element preventing Mr. Brooks ^rom bidding 
and ultimately being awarded the project, and hence his 
$61,500.00 was that he did not have a bidders bond for the same 
by 2:00 P.M., on June 1, 1^82, at the time that the bids were 
opened. 
On page 11 of the second day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that he had met with ^laintiff regarding the account-
in^ that had to be done and timely delivered, Ions before it was 
needed. 
On page 17 of the same day, Mr. Brooks testified that 
he had informed Randy Jensen (part of the plaintiff!s corporation) 
that the information had to be submitted to the bonding company 
at 8:00 A.M., and Randy said that he would take care of it. 
On page 117 of the second day of trial, Randy Jensen 
testified that he was aware of the emergency that existed in 
seeing that the work was done and delivered on time. In fact, 
he testified that he worked through the weekend and holiday to 
make sure that it was completed, so that it could be delivered 
on time. Note page 118 of the second day of trial. 
On page 120 of the second day of trial, Randy Jensen, 
went so far as to say that not only did he know that it had to 
be delivered at the right place and at the right time, but he 
had actually committed to Mr. Brooks personally, that it would 
be done. 
On page 18 o^ the third day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that he had reauested Randy to call him at home 
when the work was done, so that Mr. Brooks would not have to 
worry about petting an alternative bond, and Pandy Jensen did 
in fact call him on Saturday to assure Mr. brooks that it 
was all taken care of. 
On page 1Q of the third day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that R.andy had assured him that it would be delivered 
to the bonding; company directly, by 8:00 A.M., on the day of 
the bid opening. 
Mr. Brooks testified that he called on the morning 
of the bid opening to be sure that the same was delivered 
and Randy had assured him that it was. 
T-Then Mr. Brooks did not hear from the bonding company 
by almost 12:00 noon, he called ^arl Brown o^ Carroon and Black, 
(the bonding company) to see if there was a problem, and Mr. 
Brown stated that he had not received the documents. Note 
page 30 of the third day of trial. 
Mr. Brooks called Randy a^ain, around 12:00 noon and 
explained that Mr. Brown had not received the documents, and 
Randy said that he would have to call Mr. Brooks back. Note 
page 31 of the third day of trial. 
Randy then called "Mr. Brooks sometime later, and said 
that they had in fact been delivered to the wrong place, that 
they had been delivered to Mr. Brooks' office. Note pap-e 32 
of the third day of trial. 
Mr. Brooks then asked where had they been delivered, 
only to learn that apparently the ^lainti4^ had had the same 
merely dropped inside the o^ices of the Defendant upside 
down on the counter. Note same pa^e 32. 
To this point Mr. Brooks had been working frantically 
in petting the bid itself readv, along with the other three bids 
that he x^ as submitting at the same time, and had relied on 
plaintiff and the assurances from Randy Jensen that it had been 
worked out on Saturday, *Jote paee 24 o^ the third day of trial. 
When Brooks learned that the information needed was 
not delivered timely he was furious. Note page 125 of the second 
dav of trial. 
In fact, he explained to Pandy that the wronp- delivery 
had probably cost him the $61,500.00 -job (profit). Note oage 
138 of the second day of trial. 
Defendant submits that there is no Question that the 
-Failure to deliver the documents to the right place and at the 
right time, was the negligence of the Plaintiff. Note pages 
121 through 125 of the second day of trial. 
At this point, plaintiff suggests in its brief, that 
Mr. Brooks did nothing to secure a cash bond. 
This is not so. 
At nage 33 o^ the third day of trial, Mr. Brooks 
testified that he immediately called the bank, a^ter learning 
that the bonding company could not write the bond. 
Mr. Brooks attempted to locate the two Deople at the 
bank that cotild assist in getting a cash bond. Note page 34 
of the third day o^ trial. Both of them were gone to lunch. 
He then proceeded to draw on the ^unds that he had 
in his own account at the bank, and got cash bonds for the 
other three bids on the same overall proiect that he was ultimate-
ly awarded, and then rushed to the bid opening. Note pages 33 
through 35 of the third day of trial and also Exhibit &7-D. 
Mr. Brooks did not submit his bid for CVH-10 because 
he did not have the bidders bond nor did he have a cash bond. 
Note page 36 of the third day of trial. 
Mr. Brooks would have been low bidder however on the 
CWH-10 if he were permitted to bid, and would have therefrom 
$61,500.00 in profit. 
For information sake, Mr. Brooks would have been 
granted an overdraft position sufficient to nut together a 
cash bond, if he would have had time to apnly for the same, 
and if the two people had not gone to lunch. Note Stanley 
Hoffman's testimony on pages 146 through 153 of the second 
day of trial. 
To get a cash bond, Mr. Brooks would have had 
to put up five per cent of the total price. He had a bid 
to submit in the sum of $676,000.00 but he had $500,000.00 
of that already covered by a single supplier. So all he needed 
was five percent of $176,000.00 or $8,800.00. Note t>age 23 
of the third day of trial. 
Stanley Hoffman testifed that he would have given 
Mr. Brooks the cash for the amount on that day in nuestion, 
if ^ r. Brooks had been able to apply for the same. Note 
specifically page 158 of the second day of trial. 
Bottomline, had plaintiff delivered the accounting 
timely to Carroon and Black, however inadeauate, to get a bond, 
and even though the same was rejected, Mr. Brooks would have 
had sufficient time in which to secure a cash bond to the 
tune of $10,000.00 (even though all he needed was approximately 
$8,800.00) and the job would have been his. 
Hence, he lost $61,500.00 because of the negligence of 
the Plaintiff, and the Court would not allow further evidence 
on the snecificity and particularity of the same, yet held 
that it would have to speculate as to the exact lost, hence no 
recovery. Note page 65 o^ the fourth day of trial. 
Note as well, that the Defendant asserted two causes 
of action, one for breach of contract and one for negligence, 
as set forth above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Complaint in this case involves a situation 
where an accountant is suing a defendant for how the account-
ant himself handled the defendant's account. 
Plaintiff was aware without question, that the bill 
its was p-enerating over a substantial period of time was for 
the independant companies because it was the one that set UP 
the accounting system for each of the same, each system calling 
for a payment to the accountants. 
Plaintiff was involved in how the various entities 
were sold. Plaintiff had advised the Defendant on how to sell 
the stock and not merely the assets so that there would not be 
a problem with lingering bills, like the one that is the subject 
of the complaint. 
Plaintiff had assisted in the design of a form letter 
to be submitted to each creditor at the time of the sale, and 
both Mr. Brooks and Candy Tabor testified that Plaintiff itself 
received such a letter. 
Defendant submits that it interesting to note, that 
no one, not even the plaintiff disputes that at least some 
requests were made for itemizations on the account. 
It seems inconceivable that an accountant can do the 
taxes for different independant companies, some corporations, some 
partnerships, some individual, etc., and claim that he did 
not know that each was paying its own way, when they each had 
separate checking accounts, when there never was any commingling 
between the accounts and the accounting system itself was both 
originated by the accountant himself, and operated for some time 
bv the accountant - until the time that the said businesses are 
sold, and then the sale(s) themselves are under the direction 
of the accountant. 
^laintif^ asserted a claim ^or Si?,324.47, and the 
Court awarded "judgment -for the ^lainti^f for $5,600.00. 
The said $5,600.00 constituted an agreement ^or 
a different amount, with different parties and was struck at 
a totally different time. 
Defendant submits that the Court should reverse 
the -judgment of the lower Court on the Complaint and enter 
iudgment on the same to the Defendant on the merits and with 
prejudice, as no cause of action. 
As to the Counterclaim, Defendant established that 
but -Por the negligence o* the ^lainti"^ he would have made a 
clear profit in the sum o^ $61,500.00. 
There is no dispute as to the negligence, the only 
dispute is to the damages, and that is onlv to two issues: 
(1) Were the damages proximately caused by the negligence of the 
^lainti^ and (2) Are the damages speculative? 
Defendant submits that there is no Question that had 
the accounting, however inadeauate, been delivered on time, then 
he could have acquired a cash bond. There is no speculation as 
to this because the banker himself who would have made the 
decision for the same, testified that he would have issued a 
cash bond to Mr. Brooks, if Mr. Brooks had been able to apply 
for one timely. 
Defendant further sumits that there is no question 
that he was cut o ^ ^rom establishing his damages with any greater 
degree of particularity. 
The bid was a suppliers bid. Therefore the damages 
are easily established. The cost of purchase and the cost o? 
delivery. 
Mr. Brooks established the same with exactness. 
Therefore, Defendant reauests that this Court enter 
judgment for the Defendant in the sum of 661,500.00 as requested 
in the Motion to Amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, 
timely made. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day oJP^5ctabejrT^1985. 
)i 
I 
/ miU^JlL-
'JOHN/ WALSH 
ATT0RNEv FOR APPELLANT 
/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TEBBS, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, : 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs . 
: CIVIL NO. C 83-4210 
SKIPP BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
The above case came on for trial before the court on April 
18, 19 and 23, 1984 with Dennis K. Poole appearing as counsel for 
plaintiff and John Walsh appearing as counsel for defendant, at 
the conclusion of which the court took its decision under advisement 
and having considered the same, now renders its decision thereon. 
The case involves two different sets of issues, one set arising 
under plaintiff's complaint and the other arising under defendant's 
counterclaim, the former being separate and apart from the latter. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
Plaintiff by its complaint seeks to recover the sum of 
$12,324.47, alleged to be the amount defendant is obligated to 
plaintiff for accounting services rendered over a period of several 
years beginning in 1977. The fact that defendant requested the 
services is not in dispute nor is there any controversy over the 
quality of the services rendered. The dispute centers around the 
fact that plaintiff contends that from the beginning of its work 
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for defendant and his various entities, plaintiff looked soley 
to defendant individually for its compensation regardless of the 
work done, whereas defendant contends that a substantial part of 
the accounting services performed were done for one or more of 
his various business entities and that such work should have been 
billed to and paid by the particular business entity for which 
such work was done. 
Unfortunately, the agreement was never reduced to writing 
and each party places its own interpretation upon what was said 
and done concerning the services rendered• Their relationship 
began in 1977 when Clem Tebbs, president of plaintiff, and a CPA 
of 25 years experience, met with defendant Brooks at the latter's 
request at which time Brooks told Tebbs he was involved in a number 
of things and desired aid in his various entities, as he had had 
problems with each and was concerned about such problems as well 
as his own tax involvement. Tebbs told Brooks he would work with 
him, would get things together to see if he needed an accountant 
and that because Brooks was in a tough financial situation at the 
time, they would bill him for the work done and Brooks gave his 
OK to begin the work. The work began with a review of various 
tax returns by plaintiff's employees, the goal being to aid Brooks 
in whatever his interests were. Tebbs testified there was no spec-
ific understanding that billings were to be based upon the entity 
for which the work was done, but that it was stated that plaintiff 
would bill Brooks who was to be responsible therefor. Tebbs test-
ified he thought Brooks so stated at their initial interview. 
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On the other side of the controversy Brooks testified in 
substance that he contacted Tebbs in 1977 at the suggestion of 
a mutual friend; that he told Tebbs he had some personal needs 
as well as needs for his business entities and work was begun on 
both; that Tebbs set up an accounting system with categories; that 
he and his secretary were both concerned about there being separate 
billings for work done for each entity as each entity had to pay 
its own way and that if Tebbs had told him he would be personally 
liable for all work done, he could not have afforded to have the 
work done; that he asked Tebbs many times to give him a breakdown 
on work done for each entity and when he asked Tebbs why no bills 
had been sent, Tebbs told him not to worry about it as it was all 
coming together. 
From the exhibits received it is apparent that the first 
billing was dated March 5, 1979, some 18 to 24 months after the 
initial meeting. This billing was addressed to Brooks invidi-
dually and read as follows: 
Accounting, tax and management services as follows: 
Working with IRS on tax case $2,940.00 
Recapping and correcting accounting records 
and filing tax returns for 1977 on your various 
companies. 2,270.00 
Setting up a new accounting and bookkeeping system 360.00 
Accounting and tax services including 
financial statements for 1978 1,240.00 
Management studies made during 1977-1978 and 
year to date 1979. 480.00 
BALANCE DUE $7,290.00 
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Information contained in various other exhibits received 
into evidence bearing upon charges and payments made and upon which 
plaintiff's claim is based may be summarized as follows: 
A bill dated July 1, 1979, reflected the balance of §7,290.00 
and added four items: $963 for work on IRS tax case, $S70 for 
recapping the account records and filing 1978 tax returns for various 
companies, $747 for accounting and tax services including financial 
statements for 1978, and $470 for other management services for 
a subtotal of $3,050 which, less $600 in payments, left a balance 
due of $9,740 though May, 1979. 
A bill dated August 30, 1979 added $2,200 for accounting, 
tax and management services from June 30, 1979 through August 30, 
1979, for a total due of $11,940. 
A bill dated March 10, 1980 added $2,007.4 7 to the prior 
total for accounting, tax and management services from August 30, 
1979 through January 31, 1980, for a total due of $13,927.47. 
A letter dated January 7, 1981, from plaintiff advised Brooks 
Clem had directed that a merchandise credit for a diamond and carpet 
totaling $2,217.24 be deducted from the balance owing of $13,144.22. 
It also stated that a work in progress balance of $444.90 was being 
written off and no charges would be made for the entire year of 
1981 because plaintiff had obtained the "Osmond" account "by way 
of your introduction". 
A letter from plaintiff signed by Lee Montgomery dated April 
17, 1981, mentioned the January letter and stated they had yet 
to receive a response to their request for payment of the $10,926.98 
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remaining due. Montgomery testified at trial stating she had had 
many telephone conversations with Brooks about payment in which 
he acknowledged the debt and said if he ever got any money he would 
pay it, but on cross examiantion she testified that Brooks had 
told her that it was his position that if the accounting work was 
done for one of his companies, that company should pay for such 
accounting services. Who, other than Brooks himself, had the resp-
onsibility of paying such bills was never established by evidence. 
On August 19, 1981, plaintiff sent another letter to Brooks 
asking him to pay $400 per month on the account and that if he 
did so, it would avoid an interest charge of 1.5% per month. 
A statement to Brooks dated January 21, 1982, showed a prior 
balance of $11,136.75, charges of $2,007.47 for acccounting, tax 
and management services from August 30, 1979 through January 31, 
1980, a merchandise credit of $2,217.24 for a balance due of 
$10,926.98. 
A similar billing was sent July 21, 1982, adding interest 
charges to that date of $1,184.67, a discount of $300 for payment 
made by July 31, 1982 for a balance of $11,811.65. 
On December 22, 1982 Tebbs wrote a letter to Brooks saying 
his partners had given him until the end of December to work out 
a payment plan, that his account was the oldest account serviced 
without even a token monthly payment, and asking Brooks to work 
with him on it. 
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The next letter was dated Jasnuary 7, 1983 from plaintiff's 
counsel stating he had been retained with respect to an account 
balance then stated to be $12,724.47 which included prior amounts 
plus interest charges for the last five months of 1982. 
On January 25, 1982 (should be 1983) a letter by plaintiff 
acknowledged Brooks1 agreement to pay $200 per month lor six months 
and then an amount to be thereafter agreed upon. A similar letter 
of March 25, 1983, acknowledged Brooks' commitment to pay $200 
per month beginning April 1# 1983 but suggested it should be $300 
or $400 per month in light of the amount owed. Two payments of 
$200 were thereafter paid, one by check dated April 5, 1983, and 
one by check dated May 18, 1983, both drawn on Brooks Industries, 
Inc. bank accounts. There was evidence that prior to these two 
payments it had been agreed between^the partie^jthat the account 
had been settled for $6,000 based upon such monthly payments being 
made. 
Computer printouts were placed into evidence from dates 
beginning 1-31-79 through 1-31-84. The third sheet dated 3-31-79 
showed an amount of $7,290.00 transferred from "work-in-progress" ^ 
accounts receivable which was the amount set forth as the amount 
due under the first billing of March 5, 1979, the details of which 
are set out supra. These work in progress printouts list several 
additional charges each month up through 3-29-80 when the total 
reached $2,007.47, an amount added to prior bills as set out supra. 
The problem the court has with this computer data is that there is 
still no breakdown as to whether the work shown therein was for 
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Through exhibits and testimony the business entities were 
referred to by various names - Brooks Industries, a dba and later 
as a corporation, the Ice Cream Store, New York Pasta Co., Pizza 
Loft and Wagon or Vanderight, Tanfield Square Associates or R. 
Tanfield Brooks Company, Warehouse, Ad House, Shopping Center, 
Red Fern, Parkwest Restaurant, Das Gasthaus, and Great American 
Hamburger in Alabama. Some were corporations, some became corpor-
ations, at least one was a partnership, one or more a sole proprie-
torship. One exhibit (22-D) showed a breakdown of charges made 
in 19 79 and 1980 on work done on Tanfield Square, New York Pasta 
Co., and the Ice Cream Store. Charges reflected thereon show a 
breakdown of $356.70 for Tanfield Square, $725.50 for New York 
Pasta Co., $1,4 65.93 for the Ice Cream Store together with an amount 
of $2,4 37.27 shown as carry back claims on the Ice Cream Store. 
Evidence and testimony given at the trial identified payments 
made by Brooks over the years as consisting of one $300 cash payment 
the two $200 checks, the merchandise credit of $2,217.24 for the 
diamond and the carpet, and some minor miscellaneous payments total-
ing about $200. From this it is evident that although plaintiff 
began its accounting services for Brooks in 1977 and continued 
during the four or five years that followed, payments on account 
were hard to come by. It is also evident that plaintiff never 
got around to submitting a billing to Brooks until March 5, 1979, 
at which time the billing submitted was for $7,290.00 with the 
breakdown on that billing disclosing nothing as to what amounts 
represented work for Brooks as c.n individual or for which business 
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I have summarized the various accounting statements submitted 
by plaintiff to Brooks, but no documentary evidence was offered 
which constituted any sort of a written response by Brooks to the 
billings made or any wri tten request for a break down, as to which 
entity any particular work was done. Brooks offered only his oral 
testimony of oral requests made for such a breakdown,. While an 
apparent feeling of brotherliness seemed to exist between Tebbs 
and Brooks from the beginning so that Tebbs did not appear concerned 
about billing and getting paid during the first couple of years 
for all the work done and Brooks appeared contented to receive 
the benefit of such services with little or no concern about seeing 
that plaintiff was paid for any of the work that was being done 
for him. 
Brooks filed two answers to the complaint. In the first 
he denied receipt of, or being able to locate the complaint, as 
might be expected with commencement of the action by a ten day 
summons ris wets done iii this case, The amended answer filed January 
20, 1984, constituted nothing more than a general denial of the 
allegations of the complaint. No affirmative defenses such as 
the statute of frauds or the statute of limitations or the absence 
of necessary parties were asserted. 
I believe that the evidence clearly preponderates in showing 
that plaintiff performed substantial accounting services at Brooks' 
request over a number of years for which it was not compensated 
and a gross injustice v/ould result under the facts and circumstances 
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of this case to allow Brooks to escape complete liability therefor 
on the sole basis that such services should have been paid by the 
various business entities operated by him. However, I note that 
after the parties had agreed to settle the account for $6,000.00 
with monthly payments thereon of $200 to be paid, and two such 
payments were made in April and May, 1983, plaintiff filed this 
lawsuit on June 6, 1983, without prior notice that the agreed to 
settlement was no longer in effect. Both parties were at fault 
in the method by which the account was handled. I thus find the 
issues on plaintiff's complaint in favor of plaintiff and against 
the defendant and award judgment in the amount of $5,600 with in-
terest thereon and costs. No attorney's fees are awarded. 
BROOKS' COUNTERCLAIM 
Brooks' counterclaim contains two counts for damages, one 
alleging breach of contract and the second alleging negligence. The 
alleged basis of each claim is that plaintiff was employed by Brooks 
to prepare certain accounting documents such as a balance sheet, 
an uncompleted projects list, and a profit and loss state-
ment, for the purpose of enabling Brooks to submit a bid on a pro-
ject for the Intermountain Power Project. The evidence showed 
the bid had to be filed by 2:00 p.m. on June 1, 1982, and that 
the accounting report was to be submitted to Earl D. Brown of the 
bonding company in the morning of that day. 
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Evidence disclosed that Tebbs was advised by Brooks on May 
20, 1982, that he had received an invitation to bid on a job for 
IPP and that he would need some help in putting some information 
together for a bond and told him to contact Brown, as the informa-
tion would be needed by June 1. Tebbs assigned the work to Randy 
Jensen on May 28, 1982, told him it was for bonding purposes, and 
that he would have to work over the week end to get it done by 
June 1. Jensen called Brooks and arranged for a 2:00 p.m. meeting 
time on May 28. Jensen was also told by Brooks that the statement 
was for bonding purposes. Brooks was told by Jensen that when 
it was completed, it had to be signed by Tebbs. Jensen testified 
it was his recollection that it^was to J^e^delivered to the bonding 
company by 10;00 a.m. on June 1. 
Jensen also testified that when he met Brooks at the latter1s 
office on the 28th, he had no information concerning the state 
of Brooks1 records and asked him for the journals he would need 
to prepare the intended financial statement which included a general 
ledger, an accounts receivable journal and an accounts payable 
journal. Brooks said he had no such journals and used a chalk 
board to explain to Jensen his operations and accounting methods 
and showed him what records he had. Jensen told Brooks that due 
to the condition of the records he doubted that he could do much 
for him. Jensen said this made Brooks mad so he told him he would 
do the best he could but doubted it would be adequate to meet the 
requirements of the bonding company as Jensen knew them to be. 
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Working over the week end Jensen put together a balance 
sheet but could not prepare an income statement and told Brooks 
this was the best he could do. The document prepared was received 
into evidence as exhibit 38-D and was described as Ma balance sheet 
of Brooks Industries", a proprietorship, as of May 31, 1982. In-
cluded therein is a letter to Brooks dated June 1, 1982 which stated 
that the compilation was limited to presenting, in the form of 
financial statements, information that "is the representation of 
management". It further stated "we have not audited nor reviewed 
the accompanying balance sheet and, accordingly, do not express 
an opinion or any other form of assurance of it". The letter cone-
eluded with this paragraph: 
"Management has elected to omit the statements of income, 
changes in financial position and changes in proprietors1 
equity, and substantially all of the disclosures required 
by generally accepted accounting principles. If the omitted 
statements and disclosures were included in the financial 
statements, they might influence the user's conclusions 
about the Company's financial position, results of operation 
and changes in financial position. Accordingly, this 
balance sheet is not designed for those who are not 
informed about such matters." 
The balance sheet showed current cash assets of $10,894, 
three receivables totaling $475,995, estimated revenues in excess 
of billings on uncompleted contracts of $4 7,515, furniture and 
equipment at an estimated value of $20,565, or total assets of 
$554,969. Liabilities and proprietor's equity were reflected to 
be accounts payable $151,642, billings in excess of estimated rev-
enues on uncompleted contracts (as shown on an attached schedule) 
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of $367,606, accrued expenses of $6,761, and the proprietor's equity 
of $35,045, for a total of $554,969. 
Notes to the balance sheet included statements that the 
company followed the percentage of completion method of reporting 
income on contracts, which method recognized income as the contracts 
progressed according to the ratio of costs incurred to total esti-
mated costs; that the amount billed but not collected was reported 
as contract estimates; that furniture and equipment were included 
as estimated values provided by the proprietor; that no provision 
was made in the balance sheet for any tax effects on the net income; 
and that the balance sheet "reflects only assets, liability, and 
equity of the company and does not purport to include all the assets 
and liabilities of the proprietor." 
Jensen said this exhibit was a "compilation statement" which 
is a compilation of information furnished by the client and that 
information is taken without confirmation or verification, and 
that an adequate statement would have taken from two to three weeks 
to prepare. 
Brooks testified Jensen called him on the afternoon of May 
29, told him the work was done and ready for typing and someone 
would come in to type it and that it would be ready for 8:00 a.m. 
on June 1 but that Tebbs would have to sign it. Jensen testified 
that this was so and that he had been instructed that the statement 
was to be_delivered directly to the bonding company on the morning 
of June_l. Brooks testified that he called the plaintiff about 
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9:15 a.m. and was told the statement had been delivered. Brooks 
received no word from the bonding company until he called about 
11:45 a.m. and talked to Earl Brown and was advised the statement 
had not been received. Brooks then called Jensen. 
Jensen advised he had given the statement when signed by 
Tebbs to the secretary with instructions to deliver it to the bond-
ing company, the name and address of which were written out for 
her by Jensen. When Brooks advised Jensen Brown said it had not 
been delivered, Jensen made inquiry of the secretary who was to 
deliver it who stated that she had been subsequently instructed 
by plaintiff's officer manager to deliver it directly to. Brooks' 
office rather than to the bonding company and so she had done so, 
the only explanation being that such documents were normally de-
livered to the client. The statement was then found by Brooks 
to be lying on the counter at the defendant's office. 
Brooks testified that when he was first advised by Brown 
the statement had not been received, it was just before noon and 
Brown said it was then late in the day and he was to have received 
it early. Brooks did not thereafter talk further to Brown but 
sent Gillespie to Brown about 12:30 p.m. Brooks testified that 
with this development, he concluded the best thing to do was to 
get an overdraft position and cashier's check from the bank and 
to not get the bond. At trial it was brought out that Brooks had 
testified in his deposition that the statement was not delivered 
to Brown on June 1 by defendant after its discovery in his office. 
However, the contrary was proven at the trial. 
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Earl Brown testified at the trial. Upon a note dated 
5-19-82 Brown had recorded that Brooks wanted to know what it would 
take to bond $1,000,000 for supply contracts as he was interested 
in providing equipment to I.P.P of about $600,000. The notation 
stated Brooks was to deliver that day his personal and corporate 
financial statement and that he Mneeds line of surety credit by 
June 1". 
Brown testified Brooks called the next day (May 20) and 
asked for clarification. Brown also made a hand written note on 
that day saying the bond was to be in Brooks personal name and 
the personal and corporate financial statement would be coming 
and prepared by a CPA. Brown testified in talking to Brooks they 
discussed both a bid bond and a supply bond and he told Brooks 
what would be needed to put it together. 
Brown further testified he received the financial informa-
tion on June 1 which was brought in by Harry Gillespie about noon. 
Brown said he already had a personal financial statement of Brooks' 
personally, dated April 15, 1982, but he would want and needed 
a personal and a Brooks Industries' statement of the same date. 
After talking to Harry Gillespie on June 1, Brown dictated 
a memo for his file and when typed, he made handwritten corrections 
on it. The memo was placed into evidence as Exhibit 40-P, was 
dated June 1, 1982, and, as corrected, reads as follows with the 
handwitten changes being noted by underlines 
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Re: Brooks Industries 
Skip Brooks had Harry of Brooks deliver a. May 31, 1982 
compilation statement. It did not contain a Profit and 
Loss. While I did not understand all of the items on 
the statement due to lack of supporting notejs, it appeared 
the proprietorship's net worth was approximately $35,000.00. 
We also had an April 15, personal statement which appeared 
to include some of the asset items shown on the May 31 
proprietorship statement. There were payables shown on 
the personal which did not appear on the business state-
ment as A/R. Client wasn't able to tell me if the 
payables were paid - uncommon dates made comparison im-
possible. 
y 
All in all, there were m^y questions which Brooks was 
unable to explain to me 'satisfactorily and I told him 
we were unable to provide them the bid bond. I also 
recommended he not post any form of cashiers check or 
letter of credit since I wasn't convinced we would be 
able to provide performance bonds even if we had all the 
details. 
He asked me to give the personal and business financial 
statements back to Harry, and he might recontact us 
to -tagaft and set up future surety credit. 
It is defendant's contention that because of the negligent 
failure to deliver the financial statement directly to the bonding 
company as directed before noon on June 1, he was unable to 
obtain the bond to submit to I.P.P. by 2:00 p.m. that day, but 
that had a bond been furnished he as low bidder would have made a 
10% profit of $61,000, which amount he claimed by way of damages 
on his counterclaim. Some evidence was presented in support of 
this damage claim, but Richard Prouse testified that all such bids 
were submitted subject to the final approval of I.P.P. Prouse 
testified that his position with I.P.P. was such that when I.P.P. 
opened the bids they were submitted to him for review as to meet-
ing requirements, including the bond, following which he would 
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make his recommendation to I.P.P. as to bids to be accepted, but that 
I.P.P. made the final determination although they usually followed his 
recommendation. He could not recall if Brooks submitted a bid on the 
project (#10) in question. At the trial Brooks testified he had in 
fact been awarded three bids by I.P.P. on other projects. 
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff in support of a 
motion to dismiss brought out that defendant made no claim the content 
of the financial statement prepared by Jensen was in error; that the 
misdelivery was immaterial because when Gillespie delivered the financic 
statements to Brown there was still time to get a bond but that Brown 
had established that he issued no bond because of discrepancies in the 
financial statement prepared by plaintiff and that prepared by Brooks; 
that Brown had called Brooks when he got the statement and told him 
he was not going to give him the bond; that Brooks merely told Brown 
to have Gillespie return the statements; that even though Brooks knew 
about noon he would not get the bond, he did not go to his bank, althoug 
he had about two hours in_ which to do so, and that in any event the 
banker had testified that by then Brooks had already drawn down "his 
$10,000^'; that no evidence had been offered as to the requirements for 
the job or that Brooks' bid met those requirements; that although defend 
ant established that the records were then in Los Angeles, he made no 
showing of any effort to obtain that evidence nor that it could not 
b e
 obtained; that there was no showing of the net profit allegedly lost 
on a claimed gross profit of 10% of bid; that there was only specula-
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tion as to whether he could have gotten a performance bond had he 
been awarded the bid; that there was no evidence offered that he had 
made any profit on his bids he had been awarded on C.P.P. projects; 
that the claimed lost profits were too speculative and the law 
required that such be established with reasonable certainty with 
the fact of, the causation for, and the amount of, lost profits 
being shown; and that while case law held (664 P2d 1161) that a 
new business must be allowed to prove lost profits by reasonable 
evidence, Brooks Industries was not a new business and no evidence 
had been offered proving any types of evidence suggested in the 
case law as being acceptable to prove lost profits. 
These comments of plaintifffs counsel touch upon the fail-
ure of defendant to prove the ^legations of his counterclaim by 
a preponderance of the evidence, which of course he had the burden 
of doing. Based upon the record before the court such contentions 
have merit. I note here that while as to plaintiff's claims against 
him, Brooks pressed hardjtiis contention that services were per-
formed for his various entities for which he here had no liability, 
yet^as to his counterclaim he asserts it on behalf of himself, not 
Brooks Industries, ignoring completely the distinction between the 
two.^ 
Be that as it may, and without regard to the aforementioned 
deficiences as to proof of damages, it is very clear in this case 
that the basis of the claims asserted in the counterclaim is the 
negligence of plaintiff in delivering the financial statement to 
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Brooks' office rather than to Earl Brown at the bonding company. 
It is equally clear that Brownes refusal to issue the required 
bond was based solely upon the lack of sufficient information upon 
which a bond could be approved and not because of the late delivery 
to him of the financial statement prepared by plaintiff. The inade-
quacy of the information furnished to Brown was based primarily upon 
the lack of adequate records as maintained by Brooks which precluded 
the preparation of a sufficient financial statement upon which 
the bonding company could base a responsible decision. As noted, 
Jensen recognized at the outset and so stated to Brooks that the 
inadequacy of the available records as produced by Brooks almost 
guaranteed that a sufficient financial statement for bonding pur-
poses could not with certainty be produced. The very content of 
the financial statement itself reflects the uncertainty and the 
inadequacy of the record information. 
Thus, as I view the counterclaim^proof of proximate cause 
as an element of the claim falls far short of meeting the burden 
of proving such by a preponderance of the evidence. In my opinion 
the testimony of Earl Brown clearly establishes that such was the 
case. Recognizing that delivery of the financial statement to 
Brooks instead of to Brown was negligence, it still inevitably re-
mains that whether it be viewed as negligence or a breach of con-
tract, it was not the reason Brown declined issuance of thejbond. 
1
 thus must and do rule in favor of jthe plaintiff and against the 
defendant of no cause of action on the counterclaim. 
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However, I do not find that defendant's counterclaim was 
without merit or not brought in good faith and thus plaintiff's 
request for attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 is denied. 
Under the Rules of Procedure the parties may by written 
stipulation waive formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
If either declines to do so, the same are to be prepared by 
counsel for plaintiff. 
Dated this yQ day of April, 1984. 
/y BM 
JUDGE 
